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PAPARAZZI AND PRIVACY
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine playing frisbee in a secluded comer of a park with your two
children. You pause and enjoy the tranquility. As fate has it, you are a
celebrity. You cause a stir wherever you go. People gaze and stare at you.
Gawking fans ask you for autographs. Today you have found a few
precious minutes of solitude.' Or so you thought.
Hanging like a chimpanzee from a tree branch two-hundred and fifty
yards away, a furtive photographer dressed in camouflage seeks to shoot
your picture for his profit. 2 On a normal day, your image commands a few
thousand dollars; but, a coveted photograph of you playing with your
children could buy the photographer a new Ferrari.3 For the photographer,
shooting you is like hunting big game on an African safari. If the
photographer hits his or her target, you will be framed and mounted on
someone's mantle, like an elusive beast.
As you leave the park, the photographer confronts you and snaps
photo after photo as the camera's flashbulbs blind you. The photographer
sneers as you tell your startled children to hurry into the car.4 Suddenly, a
1. Celebrities have a hard time doing anything in private. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Brad Flees
From Paparazzi, http://www.tmz.com/2006/06/26/brad-flees-from-paparazzi/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2008) ("If Brad wants a photog-free meal his only option left these days may be the moon.").
2. Such extreme methods are not uncommon. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Brangelina Paparazzo
Arrested, http://www.tmz.com/2006/06/22/branginina-paparazzo-arrested/ ("[P]aparazzi were
hanging in trees."); see also TMZ.com, Pitt-Chasing Paparazzi Gets a Beat Down,
http://www.tmz.com/2006/04/19/pitt-chasing-paparazzi-gets-a-beat-down/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2008) ("Paparazzi have been lurking all around the compound, peeking out from bushes and
perching in trees.").
3. See, e.g., CBSNews.com, Paparazzi Going Too Far?,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/10/earlyshow/leisure/celebspot/main70083l -page2.sht
ml (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) ("Recent pictures of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie are said to have
cost US weekly nearly $500,000."); see also TMZ.com, New Law Hits Aggressive Paparazzi in
the Pocketbook, http://www.tmz.com/2005/12/30/new-law-hits-aggressive-paparazzi-in-the-
pocketbook/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) ("Shots of Ben Affleck and Jennifer Garner with their
new baby ... could be worth $500,000.").
4. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Jennifer Garner in "When Paparazzi Collide",
http://www.tmz.com/2007/01/l 1/jennifer-gamer-in-when-paparazzi-collide/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2008) (explaining how paparazzi swarmed Jennifer Garner, preventing her from getting in her
car).
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motorcade of SUVs carrying upwards of fifty more photographers
screeches to a halt alongside your car.5 They had been "tipped off' by CB
radio that you were in the park.
Hordes of ravenous photographers shout and mug photos like sharks
circling chum. 6  Your scared children start crying. You jump into the
driver's seat, shift the car into gear, and slam on the gas pedal. The smell
of burnt rubber permeates the air as your car peels out.7 For the moment,
you think you are safe.
However, as you check your rearview mirror, you notice the SUVs
8tailing you. You speed up to lose them, but they keep pace. Flashbulbs
flicker as one SUV zooms alongside your car, well over the posted speed
limit. To evade the photographers, you blow through a red light. But the
photographers unwaveringly follow in their pursuit, oblivious to the cars
and people nearly mangled in their wake. 9 As you find yourself in the
midst of a high-speed chase, traffic safety laws lose their force.
Thankfully, you make it home safely. However, this story does not
end here. Several days later, the front pages of the nation's leading tabloids
prominently display unflattering photographs of you and your children
attempting to flee your pursuers.
Scenes like this are all too common for celebrities. Despite Princess
Diana's tragic death ten years ago, 10 celebrities and paparazzi continue to
have dangerous encounters with each other. In one highly publicized
incident, a paparazzo crashed into Lindsay Lohan's car while attempting to
obtain a "money shot." 11 Another paparazzo pushed Angelina Jolie into a
high-speed chase when she went to a toy store to buy something for her
children. 12 In yet another incident, photographers ran Arnold
5. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Brit Leads Paps on Crazy Chase,
http://www.tmz.com/2007/02/22/brit-leads-paps-on-crazy-chase/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008)
(explaining that fifty frenzied paparazzi chased Britney Spears in cars around Southern
California).
6. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Jennifer Garner, supra note 4 (explaining how paparazzi swarmed
Jennifer Garner, preventing her from getting in her car).
7. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Brad Flees, supra note 1 (describing the speed in which Brad Pitt
fled the scene from swarming paparazzi).
8. See, e.g., Ann Swardson & Charles Trueheart, Princess Diana and Boyfriend Are Killed
in Paris; Car Crashes With Photographers in Pursuit, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 1997, at AI.
9. See, e.g., TMZ.com, Paps Run Red in Chase for Britney,
http://www.tmz.com/2007/ll/24/paps-run-red-in-chase-for-britney/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2008)
(describing how paparazzi ran a red light during a high speed chase of Britney Spears, "one as
much as 10 seconds late!").
10. Swardson & Trueheart, supra note 8, at Al.
11. MonstersandCritics.com, Lindsay Lohan's Paparazzi Crash,
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/people/news/article1 220017.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
12. Helen Eckinger, Chasing Angelina, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2007, at 1.
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Schwarzenegger and his wife, Maria Shriver, off the road "after
'swarming' around [their] car.., to take the first photographs of the actor
following his hospital release after elective heart surgery." 13 News
headlines are replete with these and similar encounters.
However, American law extensively protects paparazzi. 14 Armed
with the First Amendment, paparazzi consistently align themselves with
"the press" and allege their "information gathering" is constitutionally
protected. 15 They contend that the "freedom of the press" protects their
aggressive newsgathering techniques. 16 However, construing the First
Amendment in that fashion is much like giving a blank check to a child in a
toy store-it inevitable leads to unabashed exploitation. In today's age of
techno-wizardry, paparazzi have means to invade personal privacy interests
in ways the framers of the Constitution never fathomed. Accordingly, it is
necessary to differentiate between First Amendment and privacy rights.
The current statutes aimed at protecting victims from paparazzi
"information gathering" techniques are inadequate for their expressed
purpose. They fail to effectively deter paparazzi misconduct because they
do not target paparazzi's main income source: the tabloid press. Thus, the
current statutes should be amended to provide for stiffer sanctions against
tabloids for publishing a celebrity's photographs without the celebrity's
consent. Without this and other amendments, statutory privacy protection
will continue to fall short.
The European approach provides a template for reforming American
privacy law. In Europe, there is a demarcation between citizens' public
and private lives, including a more expansive sphere of protected privacy
interests. 17 This standpoint is a sensible solution. The European approach
limits citizens' "public figure" status and their resultant exposure to the
tabloid media. 18 This approach balances the interests of paparazzi and
celebrities to a much greater degree than current American privacy law.
Moreover, it is entirely possible to incorporate the European approach into
American law without violating the United States Constitution.
Part II of this Comment canvasses American privacy rights law by
outlining the common law doctrines and statutory schemes aimed at
13. See, e.g., Andrew D. Morton, Much Ado About Newsgathering: Personal Privacy, Law
Enforcement, and the Law of Unintended Consequences for Anti-Paparazzi Legislation, 147 U.
PA. L. REv. 1435, 1446 (1999).
14. See infra Parts II and llI.
15. TMZ.com, New Law, supra note 3; see also infra Parts II and III.
16. TMZ.com, New Law, supra note 3.
17. See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 69-73.
18. Id.
2008]
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protecting privacy interests. Part III traces how the Europeans have
addressed privacy rights as they pertain to paparazzi since Princess Diana's
death. Part IV proposes curbing intrusive paparazzi "information
gathering" by adopting the current European approach to protecting
citizens' privacy rights. Part V addresses and ultimately refutes any
constitutional arguments against a more aggressive stance toward defining
a "right to privacy."
II. AMERICAN PRIVACY RIGHTS LAW
The United States Constitution does not explicitly create a "right to
privacy." 19 Thus, on a constitutional level, privacy rights arise via the
penumbras of the Third Amendment (prohibiting the quartering of soldiers
without a homeowner's consent), Fourth Amendment (barring
unreasonable searches and seizures), Fifth Amendment (conferring a
privilege against self-incrimination), and Ninth Amendment (reserving
certain rights that the Constitution does not enumerate to the people). 2o
Additionally, the First Amendment protects privacy interests by:
protect[ing] citizens from being forced to declare or express an
abhorrent belief-whether by being required to salute the
nation's flag or to display a state's motto on one's license
plate.... [T]he sanctity of one's innermost thoughts remains
beyond government compulsion. The First Amendment also
implies a freedom of association ... [which] permits us to
withhold from government not only how we vote, but also to
what organizations we belong and contribute. 21
Therefore, even though constitutional law acknowledges that some privacy
protections exist, they generally yield to specific constitutional provisions
when conflicts arise.
Specifically, the weight of constitutional case law suggests "conflicts
between privacy-based claims and other constitutional safeguards
(especially freedom of the press) should be resolved in favor of the
nonprivacy interests." 22  Where there is a tension between the First
Amendment and the right to privacy, courts routinely uphold First
19. Morton, supra note 13, at 1440.
20. U.S. CONST. amends. I1, IV, V, IX; see also Robert M. O'Neil, Privacy and Press
Freedom: Paparazzi and Other Intruders, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 703, 706 (1999).
21. O'Neil, supra note 20, at 706; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
22. O'Neil, supra note 20, at 706-07.
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Amendment interests at the expense of privacy rights. 23
In 1890, Justices Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis articulated the
24need for express legal protection of privacy interests. They famously
wrote the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." 25 In reference to the
press's willingness to meet the public's demand for gossip, the authors
noted, "[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency.", 26 This led to the birth of tort law doctrines
encompassing invasion of privacy. 27
In expounding on the right to privacy, scholar William Prosser
suggested such a right exists in four torts adopted by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts: 28 "(1) [i]ntrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into
private affairs; (2) [p]ublic disclosure of embarrassing private facts; (3)
[p]ublicity which places a person in a false light in the public eye; and (4)
[a]ppropriation of name or likeness." 29 The weaknesses of privacy torts in
vindicating privacy rights of celebrities are well documented. It suffices
to say that "[t]ort law ... generally supports the proposition that an
individual in public implicitly has consented to being photographed, and
thus legal remedies extend little protection to acts of intrusive photography,
videotaping, or surveillance of subjects located in, or in plain view from, a
public place." 3' Furthermore, New York's highest court, a leading court in
shaping American law, "has consistently reminded litigants that no so-
called common law right of privacy exists in New York." 
32
In addition to the common law doctrines, some states have amended
their constitutions to include an express right to privacy. 33 However, only
ten states have expressly embraced a right to privacy within their
constitutions.34 Most notably, New York has not expressly recognized a
23. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989); Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683 (2007).
24. Larysa Pyk, Putting the Brakes on Paparazzi: State and Federal Legislators Propose
Privacy Protection Bills, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 187, 188-89 (1998).
25. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
26. Id. at 196.
27. Id. at 214.
28. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 843, 852 (2002).
29. Privacilla.org, The Privacy Torts, http.//www.privacilla.org/business/privacytorts.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2008).
30. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 28, at 844.
31. Morton, supra note 13, at 1444.
32. Hurwitz v. United States, 884 F.2d 684, 685 (2d Cir. 1989).
33. Morton, supra note 13, at 1440.
34. National Conference of State Legislatures, Privacy Protections in State Constitutions,
2008]
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right to privacy within its constitution, despite housing one of the
entertainment capitals of America: New York City. 3' Even though the
Supreme Court has recognized states' ability to "supplement the federally
ensured minimums enumerated in the Bill of Rights with respect to privacy
protection," 36 states' general unwillingness to include any express privacy
rights within their constitutions suggests that statutory remedies are
necessary to ensure privacy interests.
Several states, namely California and New York, have created such
statutorily recognized privacy interests.37 After the death of Princess
Diana, and in response to the increasingly intrusive and harassing tactics of
the paparazzi toward celebrities, the California legislature adopted Civil
Code section 1708.8 in 1998, which created a statutory cause of action for
an invasion of privacy. 38 This section also distinguished between a
physical invasion of privacy and a constructive invasion of privacy. 39
Physical invasion of privacy occurs when a defendant commits a trespass
on another's land with the intent to capture a "physical impression of the
plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial activity and the physical
invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person."' 40 It
is important to note that, like the European laws more fully discussed
below,41 this portion of the California statute looks to the subject matter of
a photograph to create spheres of privacy protection. Thus, it may be a
prudent starting point for a movement toward incorporating a subject
matter approach to United States privacy law.
The California statute also provides for constructive invasion of
privacy, which increases the scope of liability for a defendant. The
constructive invasion of privacy goes beyond mere physical invasion by
imposing liability without actual entry onto the property of another, but
rather for using "visual or auditory enhancing device[s]" to obtain a
"physical impression."' 42  The tort occurs where a person "attempts to
capture... any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/stateconstpriv03.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter Privacy Protections] (noting that the states that have expressly adopted a right to
privacy in their constitutions are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington).
35. See id.
36. Morton, supra note 13, at 1442-43.
37. Privacy Protections, supra note 34.
38. Pyk, supra note 24, at 197.
39. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.8 (West 1998).
40. Id. § 1708.8(a).
41. See infra Part III.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 1998).
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impression" of another person "engaging in a personal or familial activity"
and the attempt is made "in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable
person."43 Further, the person photographed, videotaped, or recorded must
have "had a reasonable expectation of privacy." 
44
The constructive invasion of privacy cause of action acknowledges
that technological advances may entrench upon privacy rights.45 California
wisely recognizes that individual privacy interests are susceptible to assault
from high-tech devices. 46
The remedy available to a plaintiff who can prove invasion of privacy
for a commercial purpose is "disgorgement to the plaintiff of any proceeds
or other consideration obtained as a result of the violation., 47 Moreover,
any "individual who 'directs, solicits, actually induces, or actually causes
another person' to invade a plaintiffs privacy, regardless of whether there
is an employer-employee relationship, may also be liable for general,
special, consequential, and in some instances, punitive damages resulting
from the violation., 48 Theoretically, the disgorgement provision should
discourage paparazzi by requiring them to forfeit any income derived from
selling the photograph. 49  Furthermore, in theory, the potential liability
attached should compel publishers to refrain from using paparazzi at all. 50
However, the statute in its current form lacks the necessary force to
effectively deter such conduct. 5' An amended statute can help address the
issue by preventing the use of newly created technologies from invading an
individual's privacy interests.
Despite recognizing privacy interests in statutes, these laws are
largely ineffective in promoting privacy interests and deterring invasive
paparazzi conduct. 52 The continued incidents of celebrity and paparazzi
clashes evidence the ineffectiveness of such statutes. If these laws worked,
arguably the financial impetus for paparazzi to risk life and limb
photographing celebrities would not exist.53 Therefore, these laws require





47. Id. § 1708.8(d).
48. Pyk, supra note 24, at 198.
49. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(d) (West 1998).
50. See id.
51. See infra Part 11.
52. See, e.g., supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., MonstersandCritics.com, supra note 11 (describing a paparazzo crashing into
Lindsay Lohan's car to get a money shot).
2008]
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tactics. The California statute, for instance, requires a plaintiff meet a high
evidentiary threshold before a court will impose liability upon a publisher
of paparazzi photographs. 54 However, because the plaintiff must actually
show that the publisher directed, solicited, induced, or caused someone to
take such photographs, the statute implicitly provides a loophole for
publishers that buy photographs from paparazzi but do not actually order
the photographs taken. 5
Thus, these types of statutes do not address the typical relationships
between paparazzi and the publishers who print their work because
publishers typically do not directly solicit the use of paparazzi for a
particular purpose.56 Rather, paparazzi photographs are products of
spontaneous occurrences. Therefore, publishers are safely removed from
the threat of liability because, though they purchase the photographs, they
rarely have a more active role in soliciting them.57 Even when publishers
have more control over paparazzi actions, guidance from competent
attorneys can potentially steer publishers clear of liability by exploiting the
freelance nature of paparazzi photographers.
A. California's Position
California amended its constitution to include a right to privacy,
recognized common law rights of privacy, and enacted several statutes to
58protect privacy interests. Because California has one of the most
progressive American positions on privacy rights, 59 this Comment will use
its law as a benchmark to compare to European law. 6o In a landmark
decision, Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., which fully explains the
boundaries of progressive American privacy law, the California Supreme
Court applied two common law torts protecting the right to privacy.61
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(e) (West 1998).
55. Id.
56. See generally Marc P. Misthal, Reigning in the Paparazzi: The Human Rights Act, The
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Rights of Privacy
and Publicity in England, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 287, 340 (1998).
57. Id.
58. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (West 1998); Shulman v.
Group W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 228 (1998).
59. See generally Pyk, supra note 24.
60. See infra Part III.
61. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th 200.
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1. The Shulman Decision
In Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., Ruth and Wayne Shulman
were involved in a car accident and needed the "jaws of life" to cut them
free from the wreckage.62 A rescue helicopter arrived on the scene
carrying a medic, a nurse wearing a wireless microphone, and a video
camera operator, who was employed by the defendants, Group W
Productions and 4MN Corporation. 63  The team on the helicopter
documented the rescue for a television program called On Scene:
Emergency Response. 
64
The footage showed "brief shots of [Mrs. Shulman's] limb or her
torso, or with her features blocked by others or obscured by an oxygen
mask." 65 Additionally, the viewer can hear Mrs. Shulman telling the nurse,
"'I just want to die. I don't want to go through this."' 66 Once rescued
from the crash, the crew moved her to the helicopter and took her to the
hospital for treatment. 67  Unfortunately, Mrs. Shulman was left a
paraplegic. 68
Ruth and Wayne Shulman brought "two causes of action for invasion
of privacy, one based on defendants' unlawful intrusion by videotaping the
rescue in the first instance and the other based on disclosure of private
facts, i.e. the broadcast." 69 On the unlawful intrusion issue, the California
Supreme Court found that Mrs. Shulman's privacy rights had been violated
while in the helicopter, as she had an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in those places that outweighed the First Amendment rights of the
press. On the private facts issue, the California Supreme Court held that
the broadcast was newsworthy as a matter of law and could not be subject
71
to tort liability on the private facts cause of action.
The court recognized that there is increasing media pressure on
privacy rights. 72 It acknowledged that "the 'devices' available for
recording and transmitting what would otherwise be private have
62. Id. at 210.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 210-11.
66. Id. at 211.
67. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 211.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 212.
70. Id. at 232, 237-38.
71. Id. at 213.
72. Id. at 207-08.
20081
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multiplied and improved in ways the 19th century could hardly imagine." 73
The court also observed that "today's public discourse is particularly
notable for its detailed and graphic discussion of intimate personal and
family matters-sometimes as topics of legitimate public concern,
sometimes as simple titillation.,
74
Against the backdrop of ever-increasing media intrusiveness, the
court then analyzed two common law privacy torts recognized by
California: (1) public disclosure of private facts, and (2) intrusion into
private places, conversations, or other matters.75
a. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
The California common law tort of public disclosure of private facts
contains four elements: (1) public disclosure (2) of a private fact (3) which
would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person and (4)
which is not of legitimate public concern.16
The court focused its analysis on the decisive legitimate public
concern or newsworthiness element.77 It was the plaintiffs' burden to
prove a lack of newsworthiness. 78 The court noted that it was not helpful
to separate the tort and constitutional analyses of newsworthiness, and thus
conflated both analyses into one discourse.7 9  Furthermore, the court
recognized that the newsworthiness inquiry "involve[d] accommodating
conflicting interests in personal privacy and in press freedom as guaranteed
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution." 8 0 According to
the court, the issue was whether "the facts disclosed about a private person
involuntarily caught up in events of public interest bear a logical
relationship to the newsworthy subject of the broadcast and are not
intrusive in great disproportion to their relevance." 8'
The court analyzed federal, state, and Supreme Court cases, noting
that First Amendment protections are at their zenith when truthful private
facts are published, even in the context of private individuals. 8 2 After
canvassing case law that expounded concepts of "newsworthiness" and
73. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 207.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 214.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 215.
79. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 215.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 218.
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recognizing the difficulty in defining it, the court articulated the interests to
be balanced when making a determination on a topic's newsworthiness:
First, the analysis of newsworthiness does involve courts to
some degree in a normative assessment of the "social value" of a
publication. All material that might attract readers or viewers is
not, simply by virtue of its attractiveness, of legitimate public
interest. Second, the evaluation of newsworthiness depends on
the degree of intrusion and the extent to which the plaintiff
played an important role in public events, and thus on a
comparison between the information revealed and the nature of
the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.
"Some reasonable proportion is... to be maintained between
the events or activity that makes the individual a public figure
and the private facts to which publicity is given." 
83
The court also noted that summary judgment in such cases is a favored
remedy "[b]ecause unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling
effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights." 
8 4
In applying this standard, the court reasoned that automobile
accidents are "by their nature of interest to that great portion of the public
that travels frequently by automobile. The rescue and medical treatment of
accident victims is also of legitimate concern to much of the public,
involving as it does a critical service that any member of the public may
someday need." 85 Therefore, the accident and medical treatment were
newsworthy.
The court then analyzed "whether [Mrs. Shulman]'s appearance and
words as she was extricated from the overturned car, placed in the
helicopter and transported to the hospital were of legitimate public
concern." 86 According to the court, the issue was not whether it was
necessary to show Mrs. Shulman's appearance and communications, but
whether the challenged material was substantially relevant to the subject
matter of the newsworthy broadcast. 87 Ultimately, the court found that
Mrs. Shulman's appearance and communications were substantially
relevant to the broadcast, and held the broadcast was of legitimate public
concern as a matter of law. 88 Thus, the plaintiff did not present a prima
83. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 228 (citing Good Gov't Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d
672, 685 (1978)).
85. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 228.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 229.
88. Id.
2008]
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facie private facts cause of action. 89
b. Intrusion into Private Places, Conversations, or Other Matters
The Shulman court also analyzed the tort of intrusion into private
places, which contains two elements: "(1) intrusion into a private place,
conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable
person.' 9° A plaintiff can prove the tort only if "the plaintiff had an
objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place,
conversation or data source." 91
In analyzing the first prong, the court found that the plaintiffs did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the scene of the accident
because journalists and photographers often attend and record events
occurring at accident scenes. 92 However, the court held that the plaintiffs
may have had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
interior of the helicopter ambulance because, absent a patient's consent, the
press is not permitted to ride in ambulances or enter hospital rooms.
93
"[A]II circumstances of an intrusion, including the motives or
justification of the intruder, are pertinent to the offensiveness element," and
are relevant to the second prong of the prima facie case. 94  Most
importantly, the court observed "the First Amendment does not immunize
the press from liability for torts or crimes committed in an effort to gather
news." 95 In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the balance
of First Amendment concerns weighed in favor of a free press. 96 It stated,
"[i]nformation-collecting techniques that may be highly offensive when
done for socially unprotected reasons-for purposes of harassment,
blackmail or prurient curiosity, for example-may not be offensive to a
reasonable person when employed by journalists in pursuit of a socially or
politically important story." 97  By explicitly stating the circumstances
where a journalist can engage in newsgathering techniques that may not be
offensive to a reasonable person and where the story is not socially or
politically important, the court implied the same techniques may be highly
offensive. In this case, by taking the setting of the intrusion into context,
89. Id. at 229-30.
90. Id. at 231.
91. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 232.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 236.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 237 (emphasis added).
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the court found that recording dialogue between the accident victim and her
rescuers and filming the victim in the helicopter were highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 98
c. Shulman's Legacy
Shulman's importance in developing privacy rights cannot be
overstated. The Shulman court recognized instances where an individual's
right to privacy outweighs the press's First Amendment rights.99 The
result is an important step in carving out spheres of protection for
individual privacy, notwithstanding the press's undeniable right to
disseminate news. The court rightly acknowledged that the press affronted
Ruth Shulman's personal dignity. 100 The countervailing policy interests of
preserving the integrity of a doctor-patient relationship and not "chilling" a
patient's willingness to disclose personal information to a doctor for fear of
being surreptitiously videotaped or recorded further supports the court's
holding. '0'
There are, however, some limitations to the Shulman decision that
may impede its capability to protect celebrities' privacy interests. 102 The
court's reasoning hinged on its determination that Ruth Shulman was "an
otherwise private person involuntarily involved in an event of public
interest by their relevance to a newsworthy subject matter." 103 This fact
may limit Shulman's applicability to instances involving public figures
because public figures voluntarily thrust themselves into the limelight and,
by doing so, may assume the risk of any resulting publicity. Furthermore,
despite recognizing spheres of privacy outside of the home, 104 the Shulman
court confined its determination that there was an invasion of privacy to the
fact that the helicopter was an air ambulance and ambulances were
traditionally off-limits to the press. '05 Thus, a narrow reading of Shulman
will do little to expand public figures' privacy rights.
98. Id. at 237-38 ("[T]he last thing an injured accident victim should have to worry about
while being pried from her wrecked car is that a television producer may be recording everything
she says to medical personnel for the possible edification and entertainment of casual television
viewers.").
99. Id. at 237.
100. See id. at 238.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 224.
103. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 224.
104. Id. at 236.
105. Id. at 232-33.
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2. The Taus Decision
The California Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of
individual privacy rights in Taus v. Loftus. 106 In Taus, the subject of a
child abuse study sued the publishers and authors of several articles for
disclosing details about the subject's history as well as unfavorable details
about the subject's father and stepmother that were not disclosed in the
original study. 107 In dismissing the plaintiffs intrusion claim, the court
concluded that there was no violation of the plaintiffs privacy rights
because the articles were newsworthy under the Shulman newsworthiness
test. "o8 According to the court, the private facts relating to the plaintiff
were newsworthy because the issues described in the case study were
"important and of interest from an academic standpoint" and because of the
"prominence of the... study in the repressed memory field." 109 The
disclosure of the private facts was, therefore, protected by the First
Amendment. 110
This case suggests that the more prominent a person becomes, even if
the prominence is confined within esoteric circles and due merely to the
person's affiliation with a particular subject matter (i.e., a child
maltreatment article), courts are more likely to find newsworthiness,
notwithstanding the private nature of any disclosures. " Again, the thrust
of the reasoning suggests that prominent figures have little privacy
protection because even mundane private facts may be considered
newsworthy in some circles.
B. American Finale
In sum, American law affords limited protection to individual
privacy. Celebrities, in particular, are afforded little reprieve from the
onslaught of the press because of their public prominence, and because
their daily activities are deemed "of interest" within certain circles of the
American population. Indeed, there are a plethora of magazines and
tabloids devoted solely to the latest celebrity gossip of who is dating whom,
106. Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683 (2007).
107. Id. at 691-92 (describing that the original study concerned the unnamed subject's
repressed memory of childhood abuse).





which celebrity is the sexiest, the latest late-night adventures of wayward
starlets, and the personal traumas of party-animal "Hollywoodites."
Furthermore, the concept of "newsworthiness," ill-defined and broadly
applied, does little to reasonably limit the scope of press intrusions.
There is some hope for those exposed to the relentless pursuit of
flashbulbs and tabloids. American law could more adequately protect
celebrities' privacy and safety simply by limiting the scope of Shulman's
newsworthiness standard and the definition of "public figure." 112
III. EUROPE'S STANCE
Princess Diana died tragically in 1997. 113 Her car crashed while her
driver was trying to evade a horde of paparazzi following the vehicle at
high speeds in France. 114 Her death served as a catalyst for change in
European privacy law. 115 The public outcry prompted England's Prime
Minister, Tony Blair, "to pass enabling legislation that would make the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the
"Convention") part of domestic English law," because "such enabling
legislation would allow the courts to develop English privacy law binding
on the press." 116 Thus, England publicly announced its intention to expand
privacy law to combat the intrusive techniques of the paparazzi.
All member states of the European Convention have ratified Article 8
of the Convention. 117 Article 8, titled "Right to respect for private and
family life," sets forth broad individual privacy rights. 118 In addition to
112. The dangerous encounters between celebrities and paparazzi are evidenced by the
multitude of incidents involving automobile chases. See MonstersandCritics.com, supra note 11;
see also TMZ.com, George Clooney in a Rage After Chase,
http://www.tmz.com/2007/11/20/george-clooney-schools-photogs-on-driving/ (last visited Mar.
8, 2008) (reporting that George Clooney and his girlfriend were involved in a motorcycle crash);
TMZ.com, Brit Leads Paps, supra note 5.
113. Swardson & Trueheart, supra note 8, at Al.
114. Id.
115. Misthal, supra note 56, at 288.
116. Id. at 288-89.
117. Barbara McDonald, Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205,
207 (2006).
118. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S.
222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DCI 3-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf [hereinafter Convention] (providing "I. Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be
no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others").
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public authorities, the interpretation of Article 8 also prohibits "interference
by private persons or institutions, including the mass media." 119 The
Convention defined privacy as not being:
limited to an 'inner circle' in which the individual may live his
own personal life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom
entirely the outside world not encompassed within this circle.
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree
the right to establish and develop relationships with other human
beings and the outside world. 120
This definition includes business and professional activities, as well as the
development of relationships with other human beings "in the emotional
field for the development and fulfillment of one's own personality." 121
Examples of relationships within the emotional field may include dining
with another, playing a sport with another, or going on a family
vacation. 122 The Convention's conception of privacy did not confine
privacy interests to physical zones, 123 but rather looked to the nature of the
private activity for which protection is sought. 124 This broad view of
privacy interests is more expansive than the American privacy conception
and affords more protection to the individual seeking redress. Unlike
American law, which subordinates privacy rights to the First Amendment,
European law states privacy rights and freedom of expression "are of equal
value." 125
A. The Von Hannover Decision
Von Hannover v. Germany was an important decision interpreting the
privacy rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 126 In Von
Hannover, paparazzi took pictures of Princess Caroline of Monaco, the
eldest daughter of Prince Rainier III of Monaco. 127 The photographs
depicted Princess Caroline horseback riding, shopping, "with Mr[.] Vincent
Lindon in a restaurant; alone on a bicycle; and with her bodyguard at a
119. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 61.
120. Misthal, supra note 56, at 313-14.
121. Id. at 313-14.
122. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 69 (holding that such activities are of a
private nature).
123. Id. at 66 ("There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a
public context, which may fall within the scope of 'private life.').
124. See id.
125. Id. at 61.
126. See id. at 66-73.
127. Id. at 48.
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market," skiing in Austria, leaving a Parisian residence with Prince Ernst
August von Hannover, "playing tennis with Prince Ernst August von
Hannover... [and] tripping over an obstacle at Monte Carlo Beach
Club." 128
At the outset, the court noted that the subject matter of the pictures
depicted Princess Caroline "in scenes from her daily life, thus involving
activities of a purely private nature such as engaging in sport, out walking,
leaving a restaurant or on holiday." 129 Thus, it is important to note that
instead of looking to physical zones when determining privacy (i.e., a
public or private place), the court determined that certain activities can be
exclusively private. 130 The focus is then on the subject matter of the
photographs rather than the location where they were taken.
In determining whether the pictures were actionable, the court
balanced "the competing interests of the individual and of the community
as a whole." 131 Specifically, Article 8 interests need to be balanced with
the countervailing interests contained in Article 10 of the Convention, 132
which parallels the United States Constitution's First Amendment. 133
When balancing the competing interests of freedom of the press and
the right of privacy, the court noted the importance of free expression in a
democratic society and the role of the press as a government
"watchdog." 134 However, the interests of free expression are diminished
when the expression does not stimulate a debate of general interest, and
where the subject of the expression is private in nature. 135
Additionally, the court drew a distinction between "reporting facts-
128. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65-66.
129. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 66, 72-73 ("In the Court's view, the criterion of spatial isolation, although
apposite in theory, is in reality too vague and difficult for the person concerned to determine in
advance.").
131. Id. at 68.
132. Id.
133. See Convention, supra note 118 (Article 10 provides: "1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.").
134. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70.
135. Id.
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even controversial ones--capable of contributing to a debate in a
democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions,
for example, and reporting details of the private life of an individual,
who.., does not exercise official functions." 136 The court opined that
while the former instance pertains to the press's vital governmental
watchdog function, reporting details of an individual's private life does
not. 137 As a result, freedom of expression in the latter category calls for a
narrower interpretation. 138 Because the "sole purpose of the publications
was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding details of
Princess Caroline's private life ... [they] could not be deemed to
contribute to any debate of public interest to society." 139 The court stated
that whether the photographs and articles contribute to a debate of general
interest is the decisive factor in balancing privacy rights against freedom of
expression. 140
Even though Princess Caroline "represents the ruling family at certain
cultural or charitable events.., she does not exercise any function within
or on behalf of the State of Monaco or any of its institutions." 141 The court
concluded:
[T]he publication of the photos and articles in question, the sole
purpose of which was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular
readership regarding the details of the applicant's private life,
cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest
to society despite the applicant being known to the public. 142
Therefore, the court readily acknowledged that, despite their fame, even
well known people retain privacy interests. 143
In finding that Princess Caroline's privacy rights were violated as a
result of the published photographs, the court stated:
[T]he public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing
where the applicant is and how she behaves generally in her
private life even if she appears in places that cannot always be
described as secluded and despite the fact that she is well known
to the public.




139. McDonald, supra note 117, at 221.
140. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 72.
141. Id. at 70.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 71.
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interest of the magazines in publishing these photos and these
articles, in the instant case those interests must.., yield to the
applicant's right to the effective protection of her private life. 144
Thus, the Von Hannover decision extends more privacy protection to
famous persons than do United States courts in a variety of ways. First,
rather than subordinating privacy interests to the freedom of the press, it
places each on equal footing and balances the competing interests of
individual privacy and freedom of the press. 145 Second, it reaffirms the
press's essential role as government watchdog, but does so to draw the line
where privacy interests are diminished. 146 Third, it declines to extend the
concept of "public official" to public personalities tangentially connected
with public authority. Unlike in United States courts, the legal treatment of
a "public official" remains distinct from that of a "public figure." 147
Therefore, the diminished privacy interests are properly placed with public
officials whose conduct should be exposed by the media in order to create a
transparent democracy. This important interest simply does not exist with
those who do not hold public official positions. Fourth, and perhaps most
importantly, the court suggested not to confine privacy interests to physical
zones, but to include subject matter as well. 148 For example, even if
Princess Caroline shopped in public, shopping is conduct occurring during
her daily life, and absent an overriding public interest, it would be deemed
private. 149
In sum, the Von Hannover decision illustrates a more protective
position toward individual privacy rights without curtailing the press's vital
role as government watchdog. "0
B. The Campbell Decision
Campbell v. MGN Ltd. is another case illustrating the more expansive
privacy protections Europe affords celebrities. 151 In Campbell, supermodel
Naomi Campbell sued Mirror Group Newspapers, Ltd. for publishing
photographs of her leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. 15 Campbellalleged that the defendant breached her confidence and unlawfully invaded
144. Id. at 72.
145. See id. at 68.
146. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70.
147. See id. at 71.
148. See id. at 70, 72.
149. See id. at 72.
150. See id. at 70, 72.
151. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
152. Id. at 461.
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her privacy for the following reasons: "first, the fact that she was attending
meetings at [Narcotics Anonymous], secondly, the published details of her
attendance and what happened at the meetings and thirdly, the photographs
taken in the street without her knowledge or consent." 153
The House of Lords held that the publication of information and
photographs of Campbell leaving and attending Narcotics Anonymous
meetings "was here an infringement of Miss Campbell's right to privacy
that cannot be justified." 154 According to the court, "a duty of confidence
will arise whenever the party subject to the duty is in a situation where he
knows or ought to know that the other person can reasonably expect his
privacy to be protected." 155 This standard would be tested by asking
whether publishing such "information would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities if they were in the same position
as the subject." 156
Importantly, the House of Lords also observed that when construing
Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
neither Article has pre-eminence over the other. 157 Thus, unlike in
American courts (which, according to one concurring judge in Von
Hannover, have "made a fetish of the freedom of the press" 158), the
competing interests of personal privacy and a free press are not subordinate
to one or the other, but are placed on equal footing. Such recognition has
broad implications for celebrities' privacy interests in Europe. In
Campbell, this balance allowed a celebrity to effectively vindicate her
privacy rights from the intrusive media while in public. 159 Such a result
would be unheard of in America.
C. European Finale
Europe protects privacy interests, especially those of public figures,
more broadly than the United States does. First, the European Convention
on Human Rights equally balances Article 8 and Article 10. 160 This fact
alone may have more substantial repercussions than are apparent at first
glance, as indicated by the Campbell decision, in which a celebrity's
153. Id. at 471.
154. Id. at 493.
155. Id. at 480.
156. McDonald, supra note 117, at 226 (emphasis removed).
157. Id. at 224.
158. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 78.
159. Campbell, [2004] 2 A.C. at 458.
160. McDonald, supra note 117, at 227.
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privacy right was not trumped by freedom of the press. 161 Second, under
the Von Hannover framework, privacy interests do not attach to physical
zones, but rather to the subject matter of activities. 162 This expands the
scope of privacy protection to include activities of a celebrity in public
places. Third, the courts draw a distinction between the press's vital role as
government watchdog and their reporting private details of an individual
who does not perform official duties. 163 When reporting on private details
of individuals who do not perform official functions, courts are reluctant to
compromise an individual's privacy right to preserve an unrestrained
164
press.
The European position on privacy rights can be incorporated into
United States law without violating the United States Constitution. Any
First Amendment protections the press asserts to gather news at the
expense of an individual's privacy rights may be constitutionally discarded.
A more sensible privacy policy may be pursued which would more
effectively protect citizens' safety and individual privacy rights.
IV. A NEW AMERICAN METHOD
The European model of privacy rights can be incorporated into the
American scheme without running afoul of the United States Constitution
through the use of already established American legal theories. This
section will explore how the courts can broaden their current
interpretations, and legislators can enact legislative amendments, to secure
stronger privacy rights for individuals.
A. European Standard as Applied to the "Offensive to a Reasonable
Person" Standard
In the two torts discussed above-() public disclosure of private
facts, and (2) intrusion into private places, conversations, or other
matters-the court in Shulman v. Group W. Productions, Inc. analyzed the
application of the "offensive to a reasonable person" standard. 165
Currently under California law "all the circumstances of an intrusion,
including the motives or justification of the intruder, are pertinent to the
offensiveness element." 166 In Shulman, the court took the setting of the
161. Campbell, [2004] 2 A.C. at 458.
162. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 72.
163. See id. at 70.
164. Id.
165. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 214 (1998).
166. Id. at 236.
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intrusion into consideration: The court found the recordings with the nurse,
rescuers, and inside the helicopter were highly offensive to a reasonable
person because patients have an "objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy." 167
Similarly, the Campbell court held that information gathering would
be highly offensive to reasonable persons when they are in situations in
which they expect their privacy to be protected. 168 Notably, both Europe
and California are willing to look at the context surrounding a photograph.
The Shulman court further noted that even in pursuit of a socially or
politically important story, information-collecting techniques "may not be
offensive to a reasonable person." 169 Note the use of the word "may." The
court held open the possibility that the newsgathering techniques could still
be highly offensive to a reasonable person in some socially or politically
important contexts. 170
California law is already poised to broaden its application of the
"highly offensive to a reasonable person" standard. Similar to Europe,
where the competing interests of personal privacy and a free press are not
subordinate to one another, this same balance could exist in California.
This balance is possible for two reasons: (1) the Shulman court left open
the door by using the word "may" for newsgathering in politically or
socially important contexts; and (2) the Shulman court specifically outlined
scenarios where newsgathering would be offensive because it sought to
satisfy a purely prurient curiosity. 171 For example, as in Europe, "highly
offensive to a reasonable person" could include situations of prohibiting
photographs of citizens entering or leaving rehab, or any other situation
where a citizen "knew or ought to have known that the other person could
reasonably expect his or her privacy to be protected." 172 This balance
could readily exist where the context is inappropriate and when done for
socially unprotected reasons such as prurient curiosity, 173 and perhaps even
in some situations where newsgathering is socially or politically important.
Furthermore, as one scholar noted, reasonable social expectations of
privacy can fluctuate based on circumstances, for example, commonplace
use of telephoto lenses or more technologically advanced surveillance
167. See id. at 232.
168. McDonald, supra note 117, at 226.
169. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 237.
170. See generally id.
171. See id.
172. McDonald, supra note 117, at 226.
173. Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 237.
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devices. 174 Therefore, if a law is enacted to broaden the scope of privacy
protection, the reasonable expectation of privacy will resultantly be
broader. Citizens will be able to reasonably rely on laws to protect their
interests, and if a law is enacted to protect privacy interests more
expansively than any currently in force, such an enactment may justify a
more broadly construed reasonable expectation. For example, if a law
protects a citizen's privacy interest for a familial activity, such as spending
time with his or her children in public, then a reasonable expectation would
arise that such conduct is private.
B. European Standard as Applied to "Legitimate Public Concern"
The bigger hurdle to get over in adapting European law to American
jurisprudence is the newsworthiness element. As the Shulman decision
articulates, newsworthiness can be a focal issue in determining whether an
invasion of privacy is justified and defensible. 175 Thus, molding the
definition of "newsworthiness" to exclude the daily lives of celebrities can
effectively shatter the newsworthiness shield that defendants hide behind
when obtaining intrusive celebrity photographs.
There are two main components to newsworthiness: (1) the facts
disclosed must bear a logical relationship to the subject and must be
proportional to the relevance; 176 and (2) the more prominent a figure, the
more likely the court will find newsworthiness. 177 Addressing the first
component, the standard articulated in Shulman suggests that the
newsworthiness of a given issue is tempered by the activity that made the
individual a public figure. 178 For example, if a celebrity is a public figure
due to screen acting, it is hard to see a connection between screen acting
and shopping for food. Therefore, the latter is not newsworthy.
European law analyzes the issue in an entirely different, and perhaps
more pragmatic, fashion. In determining the proportion between the
newsworthiness and the activity, European law looks at the subject matter
of the pictures. 179 Thus, a photograph is less likely to be newsworthy if it
depicts the person engaging in purely private matters. 180
However, Europe goes a step further. It requires that the expression
174. Spencer, supra note 28, at 844.
175. See Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 214.
176. Id. at 215.
177. See Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 719 (2007).
178. See Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 215.
179. See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 60-62.
180. See id. at 70.
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stimulate a debate of general interest.'81 Reporting details of an
individual's private life does not add to the public debate. 182 For example,
even a member of a ruling family can retain privacy interests if the purpose
of the pictures is only to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership. 183
This interpretation does not stray far from current California law.
California courts in other privacy cases have articulated a very similar
standard: public interest is measured by its ability to contribute to
widespread public debate. 184 Similarly, just as European law posits that a
reader's interest in private details alone does not make subject matter
newsworthy, American courts could examine whether the topic is based on
mere curiosity. 185
The second component considers the prominence of the figure.
Under current California law, the more prominent a figure, the more likely
the court will find newsworthiness. 186 In contrast, European law does not
diminish the privacy rights of public figures; it only limits the privacy
interests of official persons connected with public authority. 187 Yet, in the
United States, it is arguable that celebrities are public figures and they
therefore invite public comment about their daily lives and have reduced
privacy interests. This is a gross perversion of the constitutional standard
set forth regarding defamation and libel law. 188
Additionally, United States legislatures could adopt the European
view that when the press is not exercising its vital role as government
watchdog, its ability to interfere with the rights of others through intrusive
newsgathering is lessened. 189 Like the Princess of Monaco, celebrities
could veil themselves from the prying public eye precisely because there is
no compelling need for transparency in their daily lives as there is for
181. See id. at 72.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See e.g., Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 898 (2004); see also Waldbaum v.
Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
185. See Santini v. Am. Media Inc., No. BC 300801, 2005 WL 459195, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Feb. 28, 2005) (holding that "mere curiosity" did not equate to "public interest").
186. See Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 719 (2007).
187. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70.
188. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (establishing defamation and libel standards as applied
to public officials and figures).
189. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized thresholds of lesser speech
protection in various contexts. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement
to illegal activity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (hostile audience); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography).
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public officials. 190 By adopting the European standard of a citizen's
private versus public life, as in the Von Hannover case, courts can
effectively limit a citizen's exposure to the widespread public gaze, and,
thus, limit privacy intrusions. 191
In addition to modifying the current newsworthiness standard to
preclude the intrusive prying into citizen's lives, sanctions should be placed
on media defendants that knowingly use paparazzi photographs that were
taken illegally. Since the paparazzi's primary motivation to conduct
intrusive newsgathering is the high price they receive for those services,
eliminating their source of income will deter their conduct. Targeting the
source is more important than attacking each paparazzo individually; if one
paparazzo is sued and eliminated from the game, another will replace him.
Finally, if the United States adopted these methods, the media would
still be left with the option of attempting to obtain citizens' consent to
photograph them doing private activities. This option is the most respectful
of a citizen's privacy because it allows the citizen discretion over his or her
public image.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES
The press clings to the First Amendment to justify its intrusions, and
occasional flagrant affronts, into individual privacy rights. The First
Amendment famously provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 192 The Supreme Court
applies the First Amendment to the states by incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment, making state law subject to the strictures of the
First Amendment. 193
The freedom of the press is not an absolute right. For example, the
press may be held liable for publishing defamatory or libelous material. 194
Furthermore, as noted in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 195 the Court has held
that there is no general rule of protection for newsgathering. 196 In
particular, "generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on
its ability to gather and report the news." 197 "[T]he truthful information
190. See Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70.
191. See id. at 72.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
193. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
194. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
195. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
196. Id. at 669.
197. Id.
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sought to be published must have been lawfully acquired." 198 Thus, any
issue of the presumptive invalidity of prior restraints on media publications
does not arise in the context of information gathering which is curtailed by
generally applicable laws. In essence, if a law impedes the press's ability
to gather news, but is generally applicable to the public at large, then there
is no First Amendment infringement. Additionally, the Shulman court
upheld the constitutional validity of the California intrusion tort against the
media stating: "otherwise valid laws serving substantial public interests
may be enforced against the press as against others, despite the possible
burden that may be imposed." 99
Under this rubric, it is constitutional to impose liability on publishers
and the paparazzi for violating a generally applicable law that prohibits the
invasion of a citizen's privacy interest. 200 As a result, if a legislature
enacts a generally applicable statute that makes it unlawful to take intrusive
photographs and those illegally obtained photographs are subsequently
published, under the logic of Cohen, the publisher could be held liable
without running afoul of the Constitution.
Critics may argue that any attempt to impose liability on publishers
for the conduct of third parties violates the standard the Supreme Court set
forth in Bartnicki v. Vopper. 201 In Bartnicki, the Court held that the First
Amendment protected a broadcaster who disclosed an intercepted
conversation which was unlawfully obtained by a third party, but lawfully
obtained by the broadcaster. 202 The petitioners were the president of a
local teachers union and a chief union negotiator. 203 During heavily
publicized negotiations between the teachers union and school board, an
unidentified person intercepted a cell phone call between the petitioners. '04
The contents of the intercepted phone call intimated, even if facetiously, a
violent response to a deteriorating negotiation situation. 205 Various radio
stations and newspapers broadcast and published the contents of the
intercepted phone call, the tape of which was allegedly found in a
mailbox.20 6 The petitioners sued under a statute that prohibited publishers
from disclosing information that they knew or had reason to know was
198. Id.
199. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 239 (1998).
200. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
201. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
202. See id. at 535.
203. See id. at 518.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 518-19.
206. See id. at 519.
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illegally obtained. 207
The Court emphasized that "respondents played no part in the illegal
interception."' 20 8 To support its conclusion that the First Amendment
protected the publisher, the Court cited precedent that focused on
disclosure of information that was of "great public concern. 20 9
Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the statute
served a compelling interest-to deter criminal conduct by third parties. 210
Responding to this argument, the Court stated, "it would be quite
remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information
can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third
party." 211
Any reliance on Bartnicki to prohibit imposing liability on publishers
for publishing illegally obtained photographs taken in violation of invasion
of privacy statutes is misplaced. First, the Court stressed that its holding
was limited to the particular factual context of the case. 212 Thus, the case
may only be read to create First Amendment protection for publishers who
disclose illegally intercepted third-party cell phone conversations and only
in instances where the publisher had no involvement in procuring the
illegal interception.213 It is important to note that there was no exchange of
money in Bartnicki for the audiotape of the conversation. In fact, the
defendant found the tape in his mailbox without any indication as to its
214
source.
Bartnicki's logic also fails to extend to publishers who purchase
illegally obtained photographs. 215 The purchase alone may create a
tortious aiding and abetting relationship between the third party and the
publisher. In addition, the amount of the purchase may serve as an
incentive to violate the law.
Second, the Court, in its analysis of precedent and in its holding,
focused on the disclosed material being of "great public concern." 216 It is
hard to grasp how a celebrity going shopping is a matter of "great public
207. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520.
208. Id. at 525.
209. Id. at 527-28 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam)).
210. See id. at 530.
211. Id. at 529-30.
212. See id. at 529 (noting the Court's repeated refusal "to answer categorically whether
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment").
213. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525.
214. Seeid. at 518-19.
215. See id. at 532 n.19.
216. Id. at 528.
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concern." 21 7  If a more sensible and not utterly capacious concept of
"newsworthiness" is adopted, then Bartnicki's holding will be removed
entirely from the present discussion.
Third, the Court in Bartnicki found the statute's ability to deter illegal
interceptions as speculative. 218 In the present discussion, removing the
high price tags associated with celebrity photographs will deter
photographers from violating the law in pursuit of such photos. Bartnicki's
deterrence speculation position rests on the fact that the illegal interception
occurred without the publisher giving any financial incentive to the
interceptor. 219 Photographers use costly materials such as film, cameras,
and gas to obtain their "money shots." Without a financial reward, there
would be no incentive to violate the law or use dangerous tactics to obtain
celebrity photographs.
Critics may also argue that imposing liability on publishers will have
a chilling effect on "speech."'220 Publishers fearful of liability for
publishing illegal photographs may err on the side of caution and not
publish constitutionally protected photographs. Thus, contrary to the First
Amendment, 221 free press would be abridged. However, this "chilling
effect" argument fails for several reasons.
First, a crucial issue is citizen safety. As addressed above, paparazzi
tactics to get "money shots" have become increasingly desperate and
2222
dangerous. 2 Publishers and courts both could discern which photographs
were taken in hot pursuit, 22 and which were taken in a civilized
224manner.
Second, although the Constitution protects the dissemination of
information into the marketplace of ideas, the protection does not extend to
217. For example, America's fascination with watching others in reality television shows
should not elevate the reality show participants' mundane rituals of daily life into the realm of
"great public importance." The voyeuristic fetish of watching "'Dane vomiting on Krystal'
should not equate to "the intricacies of... running [a] platform for a D.C. mayoral candidate."
Alexis Miller, Comment, Reality Check for Production Companies: Why Writers on Reality
Television are Entitled to Overtime Pay, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 185, 208 (2007).
218. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 531-32.
219. Id. at 530 (stating that most violations of the statute at issue in Bartnicki were
"motivated by either financial gain or domestic disputes").
220. See id. at 533.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of...
the press.").
222. See supra Part I.
223. For example, a court could determine which photographs were taken in hot pursuit by
examining perspective, photo content, and vantage point.
224. For example, a court could determine which photographs were taken in a civilized
manner by examining whether the subject posed for the picture, whether the picture was taken at
a celebrity event, or whether the celebrity gave consent.
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illegal newsgathering techniques. 225  Thus, any liability imposed on
photographers for taking illegal photos is not within the purview of the
First Amendment. Furthermore, the First Amendment's protection does
not reach publishers who disseminate such illegal photographs.226
Finally, any chilling of "speech" that might occur 227 will not limit the
press's ability to write about the photographed incident. As the Supreme
Court has intimated, the availability of alternate forums to disseminate the
speech may lessen the friction between a regulation and the First
Amendment. 228 A photograph and a written article should not be
considered the same speech. A photograph depicts an image, whereas the
written word relies on language to create an impression. If the image
conveys a message (i.e., the identity of a celebrity's dinner date), then
speech is not chilled if a sufficient alternate forum remains available to
disseminate the underlying message.
Arguably, because celebrities are public figures, they invite public
comment about their daily lives and have reduced privacy interests.
However, this argument is a gross perversion of a constitutional standard
set forth regarding defamation and libel law. 229 "Public figure" status for
purposes of defamation and libel law is premised on the rationale that
public figures have access to media channels to counteract any false
speech, and thus defend themselves publicly. 230 However, in the context of
photographs, the raison d'etre of the "public figure" doctrine does not
apply because there is no falsity that needs to be defended against
publicly-a photograph (absent doctoring) is a truthful depiction of its
underlying content.
Proponents of the press's right to hound celebrities will undoubtedly
rely on the "public official" or "public figure" concepts articulated in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 231 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 232 to justify
intrusions into celebrities' lives. In Sullivan, a police commissioner sought
damages for an advertisement in the New York Times describing police
activities against civil rights protesters that contained certain
225. See, e.g., Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
226. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530.
227. For instance, speech might be considered chilled if illegally obtained celebrity
photographs are not published.
228. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1978).
229. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (establishing defamation and libel standards as applied
to public officials and figures).
230. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304-05 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
231. See, e.g., id. at 280.
232. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335-37.
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inaccuracies. 233 In Gertz, an attorney brought a libel action against the
publisher of a monthly publication for the John Birch Society, which had
asserted that the attorney was a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter."
2 34
In discussing the applicable intent standard needed to hold the
publisher liable, the Supreme Court in Gertz articulated a "public figure"
standard which supplemented the previous "public official" standard from
Sullivan. 235 There are three types of public figures: all-purpose public
figures, limited public figures, and involuntary public figures. 236 The
Court in Gertz stated that "[a]bsent clear evidence of general fame or
notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all
aspects of his life." 237 The Court then stated that for limited public figures,
it is "preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful
context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation
in the particular controversy." 238 Finally, the Court stated that, in rare
instances, a person may be labeled an involuntary public figure when he or
she "become[s] a public figure through no purposeful action of his
own." 239
Assuming that importing these definitions of "public figure" into
invasion of privacy actions is not misplaced, it is hard to see how a
celebrity meets the "all-purpose" or "limited public figure" definitions.
The "all-purpose public figure" standard as articulated in Gertz requires
clear evidence of: (1) "general fame or notoriety in the community" and (2)
"pervasive involvement in the affairs of society." 240 The dictionary defines
"pervasive" as becoming "diffused throughout every part of." 241 Granted,
a celebrity may have general fame in the community due solely to the fact
that his or her appearance is used in mass marketing. However, unless the
celebrity involves himself or herself pervasively in the affairs of society, a
celebrity screen actor or musician should not be deemed an all-purpose
public figure for the sole reason that he or she acts or plays a musical
instrument. To reach such a result would require an expansive reading of
Gertz.
233. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
234. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 326.
235. Id. at 335-37.
236. Id. at 343-45.
237. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 345.
240. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
241. Merriam-Webster Online, Definition of Pervade,
http://www.webster.con/dictionary/pervading (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
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Even if a celebrity is pervasively involved in the affairs of society,
current concepts of "newsworthiness" should limit intrusions into the
public figure's affairs to those which are proportional to relaying the
newsworthy subject matter of the article, broadcast, or photograph. 242 For
instance, built into the Shulman "newsworthy" definition is the recognition
that intrusions or disclosures of material that fall outside of the scope of the
newsworthy material are not protected. 243 Therefore, the requirement of
proportionality between the newsworthy subject matter and the facts
relevant to the newsworthy subject matter 244 may also serve as a shield for
those who are deemed public figures from media encroachments.
Furthermore, even if a celebrity is a limited public figure, the scope of
their public figure status must be limited to the extent of their participation
in a particular controversy. 245 Thus, a celebrity could be classified as a
limited public figure for anything specifically relating to his or her celebrity
status (i.e., screen acting, musicianship, etc.). For example, a screen actor
may be open to the public's gaze at awards ceremonies, movie premier
nights, and other activities related to screen acting. However, this does not
mean, as Gertz expressly indicated, that a celebrity is a public figure by
virtue of his or her celebrity status when walking down the street, going to
a party, or venturing to a toy store to buy toys for a child. 246
The determination of acceptable encroachment turns largely on the
nature of a celebrity's fame, and there is room for argument in determining
what in fact makes a particular celebrity famous. 247 For instance, one
could argue that pop singer Britney Spears became famous due to her
performing and singing ability, and, therefore, all intrusions not relating to
her performing or singing would be improper. However, if one claims her
fame stems from her sex appeal, then arguably her various pregnancies,
dating preferences, and party lifestyle may be subject to public gaze. 248 In
determining the scope of what makes a citizen a public figure, courts
should look to the occupation that made the person a public figure and not
to speculative conjectures about market behavior. Otherwise, the
242. See Shulman, 18 Cal.4th at 215 (discussing analysis of newsworthiness).
243. See id. at 222 (1998).
244. See id.
245. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
246. See id. at 352 (stating that unless there is "clear evidence of general fame or notoriety
in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society," a person is not a public
figure for all aspects of life).
247. Id. at 351.
248. See Yahoo.com, Britney Spears Biography,
http://uk.movies.yahoo.com/artists/s/Britney-Spears/biography- 133791 .html (last visited Apr. 8,
2008) (biography of Spears discussing her musical accomplishments and personal setbacks).
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marketability of sex appeal in pop-stars such as Britney Spears could be
used as a reason for fame which could justify broad invasions of privacy.
If limited in this way, any reliance by the press on general public figure
status to invade privacy would be misplaced.
In sum, generally applicable laws that curtail the "newsgathering" 
249
of paparazzi and impose liability on publishers for printing illegal
photographs will not contravene the United States Constitution. Even if
generally applicable laws do run afoul of the First Amendment, the laws
can pass constitutional muster if they meet the strict scrutiny test. 250 Under
this test, a law is constitutional if it serves a compelling government
interest and if it is narrowly tailored "such that there are no less restrictive
means available to effectuate the desired end.''251 There is no more
compelling government interest than protecting the immediate safety of
citizens. Paparazzi tactics not only endanger the physical safety of any
given celebrity, but also jeopardize the safety of countless other pedestrians
and automobile drivers who may be ensnared in a high speed paparazzi
chase. Furthermore, a law restricting the ability of paparazzi to take
photographs of a celebrity engaging in private activities is narrowly
tailored to achieve this interest by the least restrictive means because it
only targets illegally taken photographs and not the written word, which
results in only a de minimis effect on a free press. Therefore, even if the
Constitution itself does not support regulating paparazzi tactics, a generally
applicable law targeting this conduct will likely meet a strict scrutiny
standard and thus would be constitutional.
Arguably, laws that were designed to discourage paparazzi privacy
intrusions would not meet strict scrutiny because they are overbroad-they
regulate more conduct than is necessary to achieve their purpose. For
example, the press may argue that if the concern is pedestrian safety, then
traffic laws should be enforced. However, enforcement of the traffic laws
can only protect pedestrians after a traffic violation has occurred, rather
than removing the impetus for causing the traffic violation in the first place.
Given the paparazzi's regular pattern of violating traffic laws,252 regulating
paparazzi in an attempt to prevent violations is appropriate. Therefore,
preventative measures could be narrowly tailored to regulate such conduct
so that those measures are not deemed overly broad.
249. TMZ.com, New Law, supra note 3 (discussing a California law aimed at curtailing
aggressive paparazzi conduct; using "newsgathering" loosely).
250. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815 (2007).
251. Id.
252. See, e.g., MonstersandCritics.com, supra note 11; Morton, supra note 13, at 1446.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly there are not only problems between the unrestrained
paparazzi and celebrities' right to privacy, but also between the
unrestrained paparazzi and celebrities' physical safety. 253 Clashes between
the paparazzi and celebrities continue to this day. 254 The violent nature of
these interactions is apparent when observing the drastic lengths paparazzi
are willing to go to obtain a "money shot., 255  This author addressed
several ways to strengthen celebrities' privacy rights. 256
In particular, intrusive paparazzi tactics can be curbed by eliminating
the daily existence of American celebrities from a definition of
"newsworthiness" 257 unless they are filling a public role which has made
them famous. Additionally, laws prohibiting the photography of celebrities
in their daily lives and placing sanctions on the indirect employers of the
paparazzi-the tabloid media-will effectively deter future dangerous
paparazzi conduct.
Moreover, courts could focus more on the relationship between the
newsworthiness of a given issue and the activity that made "the individual
a public figure." 258  If "social value" is what constitutes
newsworthiness, 259 it is hard to imagine a more perverse concept of social
value that incorporates as "valuable" Paris Hilton's late-night dining
preferences or Lindsay Lohan's driving habits. This is precisely the
prurient gossip that Warren and Brandeis decried in their seminal article. 260
This "social value,"261 for whatever readership it may entice, should not be
sufficient to outweigh a person's right to privacy and safety.
In addition to modifying newsworthiness to preclude the intrusive
prying into celebrity lives, sanctions should be placed on media defendants
who knowingly use paparazzi photographs that were taken illegally. Given
the high prices paid to paparazzi photographers, it is important to eliminate
the source of their wealth in order to deter their conduct. Targeting the
source is more effective than attacking a many-headed paparazzi hydra
253. See, e.g., MonstersandCritics.com, supra note 11; Morton, supra note 13, at 1446.
254. See, e.g., MonstersandCritics.com, supra note 11; Morton, supra note 13, at 1446.
255. See, e.g., Eckinger, supra note 12.
256. See supra Parts IV-V.
257. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 222 (1998) (determining
limitations on privacy based on "newsworthy" content).
258. See id. at 222.
259. See id.
260. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 214-15 (stating that "[T]he law must...
protect those persons with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern.").
261. See Shulman, 18 Cal. 4th at 222.
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because even if one paparazzo is sued and eliminated from the game, there
is another one to replace him.
Finally, the media has the option of getting the consent of celebrities
to photograph them doing private activities. This option should be the one
most encouraged because it respects privacy interests and eliminates
potential lawsuits.
It is easy to slough off the plight of celebrities by saying "they are
rich and famous, and this is just a cost of doing business." However,
celebrities are American citizens who deserve the protection of the law for
their privacy rights and safety. Protecting their privacy is protecting our
privacy. It will be a sad day when the antics of a group of fiendish
photographers recreate the nightmare of Princess Diana's death 262 on our
own soil. Action must be taken now.
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